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Abstract 
 
 
The link between technology adoption and economic development is widely recognized, but 
too frequently overly broad generalisations are made. This thesis argues that most of 
technology adoption and, in turn, economic development, can be meaningfully estimated by 
three sectors: energy, transport and information and communication technologies (ICT). We 
estimate and specify the effect of these sectors on technology adoption and measure it 
through the proxy variables of energy, transport and ICT. The results indicate that a 
significant portion of economic development can be attributed to the efficient use of energy, 
transport and ICT. While the effects of insufficient energy production have lessened in recent 
years, the availability of efficient, high intensity power has become a major factor in 
determining growth. We argue that, while transport efficiency remains a crucial contributor 
to development, the most future growth potential stems from ICT and its applications. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 The role of technology in economic growth is almost universally recognized 
(Metcalfe, 2010). However, the multifaceted nature of technology is frequently ignored or 
overlooked. While technology is one of the central drivers of economic development, there 
can be hidden pitfalls with its adoption, namely technological lock-ins and path dependency 
(Fouquet, 2016; Pierson, 2000). There are also key technological fields of application that are 
principal to growth – energy, transport and information and communication technologies 
(ICT) – and distinguishing these sectors helps to refine the role technology plays in economic 
development.  
Growth economics literature recognises the role of technology, at the same time also 
highlighting the importance of institutional (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012; Mokyr, 2002; Shin, 
2018) and cultural factors (Tabellini, 2010) as well as the role of the state (Bardhan, 2016; 
Borcan et al., 2017; Doucouliagos, Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). Many treatments of the role of 
technology are one dimensional; treating it as a single variable in models for growth when, in 
fact, technological development is multidimensional (Schot, Kanger, 2018; Geels, 2002). 
Combinations of various technologies that co-exist in real time can work both for and against 
economic development. Existing technological paradigms can hamper progress and create 
lock-ins: situations in which states become stuck in sub-optimal paths for prolonged periods 
of time (Fouquet, 2016). Old and new technologies exist alongside each other and ultimately 
their combination and how they evolve determine development. A one-dimensional treatment 
of technology often leads to overly general recommendations for state intervention in 
technological development. 
The main aim of this thesis is to estimate and specify the effect technology has on 
economic development. We aim to show that most of technological progress can be 
summarized by three technological sectors – energy, transport and ICT. To estimate the effect 
of technology on economic development, we treat technology adoption as endogenous. In 
order to do so, a plausible source of exogenous variation in technology indicators is needed. 
Perez (2010) identified five technological revolutions, starting with the Industrial Revolution 
and concluding with the current Age of Information and Telecommunications. Each 
revolution involved large surges of development that profoundly transformed society. These 
profound changes centred around upheavals in the fields of energy, transport and ICT. In this 
thesis, we link current differences in technology adoption to those three sectors and argue that 
they have the potential to indirectly account for a substantial portion of economic progress.  
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This thesis contributes to the literature by determining the role technology adoption 
plays in economic development. The impact of how well states have adopted technology 
through time is empirically measured through the proxy variables of the last technological 
revolutions (Perez, 2010) – energy, transport and ICT. We use the method of instrumental 
variables estimation, where the dependent variable is GDP per capita, a technology adoption 
index is treated as endogenous and energy efficiency regulation, efficiency of air transport 
services and fixed-broadband internet subscriptions are used as instruments. While the 
narrow sub-indicators that we use as instruments are likely not to have a sizeable direct 
impact on GDP per capita, the paper shows that they are a suitable measure of technology 
adoption. This paper demonstrates statistically significant effects between the energy, 
transport and ICT instruments and technology adoption and, in turn, between GDP per capita. 
Our results are robust to the addition of other instruments (electrification rate, quality of 
roads, internet users) and controls. The main data used in this research was taken from the 
World Bank (including the Global Competitiveness Report dataset) and Borcan et al (2017) 
and it was for 94 countries and mostly for the year 2017. 
There is ample proof why energy, transport and ICT should be placed at the centre of 
the discussion revolving around technology adoption and economic development. 
Innovations in energy technologies have often been in the middle of wider technological 
surges, starting from water and steam power during the first Industrial Revolution to the more 
recent multiple source and flexible use electricity networks, enabling development (Perez, 
2010). Even though the role of energy is likely to change at different stages of development, 
with it being a robust constraint at the early stages and less so later on, energy is essential to 
all production. Moreover, energy intensiveness is steadily increasing (Benthem, 2015), but 
there are crucial differences in the implications various technologies (renewable, fossil, 
nuclear etc) provide. Energy efficiency is the most appropriate measure of energy technology 
and advancements in it have been shown to trigger increases in total factor productivity. 
(Cantore et al., 2016)  
Transport technology, as both a key carrier branch of the economy in addition to 
forming a notable portion of its infrastructure, has always been at the heart of larger 
technological progress (Perez, 2010). Transportation technology offers major market-
widening effects, mobility and efficiency of resource distribution; all of which are crucial for 
establishing competitive markets. While being the “wheels” of any economic activity, it can 
also potentially be an important tool to combat poverty and inequality (Cigu et al., 2019). 
Efficiency of air travel was thought best to represent transport technology in the empirical 
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part of this paper, as of the major means of transport – road, rail, air and water – it is usually 
the most advanced technologically.  
The most recent technological surge has revolved around ICT and has completely 
redesigned modern societies and played a large role in globalisation (Perez, 2010). For 
example, the post-1995 surge in productivity1 can be attributed to digital technology 
investment and usage (Goldfarb, Tucker, 2019). On the downside, ICT has also opened a 
“digital divide”, as those being deprived of ICT services miss out on the momentous growth 
opportunities advanced countries enjoy. ICT services permit participation in the global 
market and projects to develop them provide much economic development potential, 
especially in poor areas. (Avgerou, 2003)  
The key takeaway of the paper is that investments into the technologies of energy, 
transport and ICT have the potential to spur profound economic and societal development, 
but states should take care to keep the technological landscape flexible in order to promote 
innovation and further technological shifts. Of the three sectors, the most vulnerable to lock-
ins is energy technology, because developing states tend to emulate the energy-intensive 
paths of developed countries. The lure of cheap energy, which is essential for economic 
development in the early phases, often leads to inefficient energy consumption, large social 
costs and debt in the long run. Our results suggest that the efficiency of transport services has 
been a highly influential determinant of technology adoption and economic development. 
However, ICT has had the biggest effect on technology adoption and it offers a crucial source 
of future growth potential. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: section 2 reviews the literature 
related to technology, focusing on the role both technology and states play in economic 
development. Section 3 covers the inter-dependent development of technologies, with 
subsection 3.1 focusing on energy, subsection 3.2 on transport and subsection 3.3 on ICT. A 
detailed overview of the data and method used can be found in section 4. Section 5 presents 
the results and section 6 conducts an exercise to test the robustness of the findings. Finally, 
the conclusions are in section 7. 
 
 
 
1 Prior to the 1990s, the Solow productivity paradox persisted, where heavy investment into IT, specifically 
incorporating computers into daily use, did not appear to have any impact on productivity measures 
(Brynjolfsson, 1993; Goldfarb, Tucker, 2019). 
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2 Technology in Economic Development and the Role of the State 
 
Technology is instrumental not only to economic growth, the creation of wealth and 
poverty alleviation, but also to wider societal issues such as globalisation, climate change, 
and the provision of health care and education (Faulkner et al., 2010). Technological progress 
is vital in order to understand growth and development, but as the link between productive 
factors and human satisfaction, it is also a primary part of the structure of economic life and 
any theory of coordination. It is widely accepted that improvements in productive efficiency 
have been closely tied to advances in the underlying technology. As a way of operating, 
technology relies heavily on the human dimensions of skill and knowledge. It comes in 
various forms, as information and knowledge, as skills and abilities and as human built 
structures. (Metcalfe, 2010) 
 Knowledge can move freely, so the benefits of new technologies have significant 
spill-overs to other areas. As it comes to regional economies, the degree to which 
technological spill-overs are appropriated locally can be more influential to economic 
development than the resources poured into local knowledge production or research and 
development might be. (Koo, 2005) 
When it comes to economic growth models, Solow (1956, 1957) constructed a model 
in the neoclassical framework that attributed growth to capital, labour and technological 
progress and argued, that as capital and labour inputs eventually exhibit diminishing returns 
to scale, technological progress is the most important driving force of economic growth. 
Although a significant contribution to the field, Solow’s theory has some crucial 
shortcomings. It treats technology as an external factor not determined in the growth process 
and assumes that technology adoption is costless and instantaneous, with technology nonrival 
and nonexcludable. These ideas have proven inconsistent with the empirical evidence of 
private firms’ R&D spending increases for the past several decades, indicating that there has 
been an incentive to develop new technologies (Koo, 2005). New growth theory (Arrow, 
1962; Lucas, 1988) provided an alternative approach. Arrow (1962) attributed the growth of 
labour productivity to workers’ cumulative experience, often labelled as “learning by doing”. 
Because this process is reactive to labour productivity and market incentives, technological 
progress becomes a part of the growth process. Arrow also assumed that knowledge was a 
pure public good, a conjecture that was modified by Romer (1990), who considered 
technology as partially excludable giving the incentive to invest in R&D. Consequently, 
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technological change was no longer treated as exogenous. Schumpeter (1911, 1939) 
recognized that technological change and entrepreneurship are major drivers of economic 
growth, but he too considered technology as exogenous. However, his followers, the neo-
Schumpetarians, consider novelties, of which technological innovation is the most notable 
form, to be the key driver of economies. (Hanusch, Pyka, 2007; Perez, 2010) Novelties often 
emerge in niches and are geared to solve the problems of existing technologies (Geels, 2002). 
Building on the ideas of Schumpeter, Aghion and Howitt (1992) also contributed to the 
endogenous growth literature, considering innovation as the driver of economic growth. Even 
though its popularity has dropped since the late 1980s and early 1990s, endogenous growth 
literature is still growing, but there is little consensus on the standard format of the model 
(Koo, 2005). 
 Technical change needs to be studied in the context of innovation, at the convergence 
of the economy, technology and the socio-institutional level (Perez, 2010). Despite variety in 
the consequences and sources of technical change, it is not a completely random process.  
There are consistencies in patterns which indicate the existence of technological paradigms 
and trajectories. Those patterns provide profitable and innovative investment opportunities 
and long-term growth in new markets along defined paths of development. (Freeman, 1988)  
Existing technological paradigms may, however, also hamper further innovation and 
progress (Pierson, 2000). States play a key role in economic development and the support and 
incentives they offer for technology creation and adoption make up an essential part of its 
foundation. As states mature, their growth tends to dwindle and steady. There are a myriad of 
potential reasons for this. Technological transitions could be the key. As Geels (2002) 
pointed out, for stable economies, the networks of most industries within one technological 
regime become very rigid. This is also supported by Perez (2010), who believes that when the 
potential of one technology is exhausted and a new one begins to emerge, the embedded 
institutions and habits of the existing paradigm restrict innovation and function as a 
significant inertial barrier. Moreover, incorporating more efficient processes and tools, like 
IT solutions, into public institutions has been slow and is far from fully developed. Social and 
human resistance to change manifests itself as organisational inertia and, while it can be 
overcome by competition in the market economy, a lack of survival pressures in most public 
institutions has resulted in slow adoption.  
Regimes do create innovations, but they are typically incremental. Radical 
innovations are generally generated in niches which are insulated and protected from the 
standard market selection in the regime. Profound technological advancements can initially 
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have very low performance and be both extremely expensive and cumbersome. For example, 
many radically new inventions, such as the digital computer and radar, originated from 
military technology. The military technology niche provided a much better opportunity to 
develop than the normal market would have granted them. Ultimately, an inflexible 
landscape hinders technological transitions, stagnating growth. It is therefore imperative to 
recognize opportunities to cradle technological innovation and aid in its transition to the 
competitive market. Understanding the means to keep the technological landscape as flexible 
as possible could be the key element for continued competitive economic progress (Geels, 
2002).  
In addition, random chance or investment decisions can have long lasting effects on 
development. Economies can become stuck on socially sub-optimal paths since eventual 
outcomes often depend on the early history of particular technologies, often producing lock-
ins. (Fouquet, 2016) Path dependency, as defined by Pierson (2000), is a self-reinforcing 
process in which each step along the path increases the probability of making further steps 
along the same path. This phenomenon can be triggered by a rigid technological landscape. 
Kemp et al (2001) believed that there are three alternatives to intentionally construct a 
desirable path. The most basic method is brute force; planning a new system and overcoming 
the barriers that it faces by elimination. This method is frequently used for physical 
infrastructures and complex technical systems such as electricity grids. The second option is 
to provide economic or social incentives to direct the development path. Lastly, one can build 
on the ongoing dynamics of sociotechnical change and modulate it by applying pressure, for 
example with taxation. Dosi (1982) believed, that for new technologies to come to the 
forefront, much importance must be placed on institutions, which direct and support the 
accumulation of experience and knowledge. Institutions must create the right incentives to 
combat inertia. Another vital factor for supporting innovation is the existence of a large 
collection of risk-taking actors who are willing to try different technical and commercial 
solutions.  
Kanger et al. (2020) distinguished six policy intervention points to support systems 
change. First, different niches should be stimulated. Examples of such measures include 
funding R&D, foresight exercises and relaxing the regulatory environment. The central 
aspect of this intervention is to sustain a variety of technologies. Second, niches should be 
accelerated so that emerging technologies can enter the market. Third, existing regimes 
should be destabilised so that niches can break through. Examples of destabilizing measures 
include the use of taxation to apply economic pressure. Fourth, the spill-over effects of 
 9 
regime destabilization should be addressed, meaning policy action should be directed at dis-
embedding the system from its environment while alleviating and anticipating possible 
negative spill-overs. Measures in this fourth category include providing educational and 
financial support to manage skill mismatch and structural unemployment. The fifth policy 
intervention entails providing coordination for multi-regime interaction. As socio-technical 
systems are not simply created internally and result from the mutually reinforcing 
developments in multiple systems, this intervention entails breaking already existing links 
and forging new ones. Last, to change factors beyond specific systems and niches, the 
landscape should be tilted. This step includes participating in international negotiations to 
reach collectively binding agreements. One example of a successful intervention of this type 
was the phasing out of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons, a chemical compound particularly 
harmful to the ozone layer). 
 
3 Inter-dependent Development of Technology and Applications 
in Energy, Transport and ICT 
 
The most momentous technological shifts are technological revolutions. Similar to 
how individual innovations are set in technology systems, the latter are interconnected in 
technological revolutions, which are a set of radical interrelated breakthroughs, creating 
interdependent technologies. Technological revolutions are distinguished from an arbitrary 
collection of technological systems by two factors. First, the systems which undergo a 
revolution have highly interconnected and interdependent markets and technologies. Second, 
and more importantly, revolutions have the capacity to transform the rest of the economy and 
society. Perez (2010) recognized five of such revolutions, which are summarized in Table 1.  
  
 10 
 
Table 1. The five Technological Revolutions 
Technological 
revolution 
Year 
Initiating 
technology 
New/redefined technologies, industries or 
infrastructures 
The Industrial 
Revolution 
1771 
Arkwright's 
mill 
Mechanisation, canals and waterways, water 
power 
Age of Steam and 
Railways 
1829 Steam engine 
Railways, great ports, depots, worldwide 
sailing, city gas, steam power, iron and coal 
mining, rolling stock production 
Age of Steel, 
Electricity and 
Heavy Engineering 
1875 
Carnegie 
Bessemer steel 
plant 
Steam engine for steel ships, worldwide 
shipping, electrical networks and equipment 
industry, transcontinental railways, national 
telephone 
Age of Oil, the 
Automobile and 
Mass Production 
1908 Ford Model-T 
Mass-production (e.g. automobiles), cheap 
oil, internal combustion engine, networks of 
roads, ports, airports, worldwide analogue 
telecommunications 
Age of Information 
and 
Telecommunications 
1971 
Intel 
microprocessor 
Computers, software, telecommunication, 
multiple source, flexible use electricity 
networks, high-speed multi-modal physical 
transport links 
Source: author, based on Perez (2010) 
 
Each revolution consists of a large surge of development or great upheavals of the 
wealth-creating potential of the economy, producing, among other things, whole new 
supplementary or complementary technologies and infrastructures which provided major 
increases in the effectiveness and efficiency of most activities and industries. The fluctuations 
of growth and productivity increases, along with structural change, can be traced by 
identifiable technological change, which was dramatically shaped by the technological 
revolutions. Perez (2002) highlighted that there is a certain time lag for the spread of 
adopting new technologies, characterized by a large divergence in the growth rates of 
industries and countries. 
 The Industrial Revolution kick-started factory production and mechanization, creating 
new local networks and waterways. The Age of Steam and Railways rapidly expanded 
production, with power centres, railways and ports springing up. Using the improved 
steamships and transcontinental railways built with steel, the Age of Steel, Electricity and 
Heavy Engineering created a worldwide shipping industry. The electrical equipment industry 
was also redefined, electrical networks were created. The networks of roads, highways, ports 
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and airports that we are familiar with today were largely built during the Age of Oil, the 
Automobile and Mass Production. In addition, the internal combustion engine was invented 
and notable improvements were made in energy intensity and worldwide analogue 
telecommunication. The most recent revolution, the Age of Information and 
Telecommunications, ushered in globalization through the development and wide use of 
computers, software, the Internet and digital telecommunication. It also introduced high-
speed multi-modal physical transportation links by air, land and water.  
 If we consider the sectors where both the technologies that initiated the revolutions as 
well as where most of the accompanying momentous technological change occurred, it 
becomes clear that it is possible to distinguish central areas of technology adoption. The key 
sectors or fields of applications around which those five revolutions revolved were energy, 
transport and information and communications technology (ICT). As a result, we focus our 
analysis on them and aim to determine how they, through their impact on technology 
adoption, affect economic growth. We claim that they account for a substantial portion of 
economic development.  
 
3.1 Energy 
 
Energy and its infrastructure often has impactful repercussions on economic 
development. While growth cannot be explained in its entirety as a function of energy supply, 
energy is essential to all economic production. Energy scarcity imposes a robust constraint on 
economic growth. However, when it is readily available, marginal increases have greatly 
reduced effect. Empirical evidence is straightforward in indicating that energy availability 
plays an instrumental role in enabling growth. Nevertheless, technological progress, 
improved fuels and a larger availability of energy has greatly lessened energy’s limiting 
effect on growth. (Stern 2010) 
The impact of energy services is prone to change at different stages of economic 
development. Although access to affordable energy, provided by large scale projects and 
subsidies, is essential for economic development, it may inflict large social costs in the long 
run. Cheap energy options are likely to lock states into energy-intensive paths, making them 
vulnerable to energy price shocks. Those lock-ins frequently happen during industrialisation. 
If inadequately managed, an energy-intensive system that was once instrumental for rapid 
growth can, in the long run, lead to inefficient energy consumption and heavy debt. 
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Suboptimal energy-intensive paths lead to significant periods of inability to adjust fully to 
shocks and changes in market circumstances. (Fouquet 2016) 
Benthem (2015) identified three key factors to energy intensiveness. More efficient 
technologies drive it down, while more export from developing economies and energy-
intensive bundle consumption increases it. His study also found that energy-intensity has 
increased overall, meaning the first factor has been outweighed by the latter. This indicates 
that developing countries follow energy-intensive patterns and is presumably linked to 
various technological, institutional, infrastructural and behavioural lock-ins. For example, 
Fouquet (2016) highlighted that in nuclear power dominated France, where the electricity 
industry is interlinked with policy decisions and is highly concentrated, it is difficult to 
progress towards a more liberal and competitive market with potentially different energy 
systems, producing a major vulnerability and leading to an efficiency gap.  
Various energy sources have different spill-overs on industrialisation and economic 
development. Developing countries today frequently base their energy policies on the 
existing industrial development paradigm of already industrialised nations. They construct 
heavy industrial clusters with high energy intensity in order to increase living standards and 
combat poverty. This usually entails using coal-based technologies, which in turn leads to 
extensive social costs such as health effects from ambient air pollution and the vast economic 
costs of global warming. Measures that account for the social costs of fossil fuel, such as 
carbon taxes, can improve long-term competitiveness and sustainable development. A crucial 
institutional challenge is to account for macroeconomic spillovers and structural change in 
environmental policy making.  (Kalkuhl et al, 2019) 
While some energy sources, like coal, predate recorded history, we can also find 
notable examples of niche development. The first experimental nuclear power apparatus was 
created in the University of Chicago in 1942, but it became a commercial power option in the 
1950s only thanks to military interest in developing nuclear power (Krivit, Lehr, 2011). 
Despite this exception, the development of energy systems has generally been interlinked 
with the technological surges identified by Perez (2010), because of the importance of low 
cost energy inputs. Coal played a key part in the second and third technological revolutions, 
while we saw a shift to oil as the predominant source of energy in the fourth revolution 
(Kanger, Schot, 2019). As the dependence on fossil fuels accelerated, so did energy intensity. 
Swilling (2013) points to the fossil fuels industry use of their financial might to structurally 
block further transitions to understand why more sustainable energy sources have not become 
widespread in the face of growing ecological pressures. Different energy sources continue to 
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co-exist alongside one another, so a general measure of a countries’ energy technology can be 
gathered by assessing energy efficiency. Simple electrification rates or supply measures have 
lost their usefulness as indicators of energy technology. Because of this, we use energy 
efficiency regulation as an indicator of in the central model of this research. We expect this 
indicator to capture both the technological component as well as the institutional surrounding. 
This approach is supported by Cantore et al (2016), who argued that technological change 
through energy efficiency in manufacturing is a driver of growth.  They found that energy 
efficiency triggered increases in total factor productivity, which can be used as an accurate 
proxy for technological change.  
 
3.2 Transport 
 
 Transport is viewed as a key element of economic development because it 
possesses major market-widening effects as well as being integral for establishing 
competitive markets. Transport is essential for primary, secondary and tertiary production.  
The transport sector can be regarded as a tight combination of two activities: a construction 
and maintenance industry and a service industry. Efficiency improvements in transport 
services have spurred productivity growth by providing cheaper transport, with superior 
regularity and faster speeds (Ville, 1990). 
Transport infrastructure is a significant economic growth factor. It provides mobility, 
efficiency and effectiveness in resource distribution. It can be classified as a productive 
public expenditure, as it accelerates access to services, increases market and labour mobility, 
improves social welfare and provides access to the exporting market. (Cigu et al, 2019) 
Transport infrastructure can spur changes in factor markets and firm location judgments 
which in turn create spatial clusters of economic actors and sectors and stimulate innovation, 
leading to a further reduction in costs. (Afraz et al, 2006) 
Important advances of transport technology came not only through completely new 
technologies, but through organisational improvements such as timetable management and 
occupational specialisation. Development in the transport sector also prompted advancement 
in financial markets and created new forms of finance. Significant transport projects can also 
have a counter-cyclical influence on the economy since major, long-term projects are usually 
started in periods of prosperity but are completed during economic downturns during which 
they provide employment and create demand for supply firms. The betterment of transport 
 14 
also stimulated shifts in population movement; most notably towards suburban expansion. 
(Ville, 1990) 
 Transport infrastructure is also a noteworthy political instrument, implemented not 
only to spur economic growth, but to reduce inequality through public policies. Infrastructure 
developments usually require a sizable amount of capital and public expenditure, which 
places substantial pressure on public authorities to utilize resources efficiently. (Cigu et al, 
2019) Great care should be taken in planning transportation systems, as they are one of the 
most impactful and long-lasting lock-ins, outlining the behaviour and geography of countries 
for centuries (Fouquet 2016). There is a real risk of socio-technical lock-in to a sub-standard 
transport system. The mobility and land use repercussions for rail and road projects have 
widely varying effects on population density, choice of transport mode and overall carbon 
impact in an urban region. Those far-reaching effects are frequently not taken into 
consideration in large-scale transportation infrastructure development plans.  (Driscoll, 2014) 
Technological change in transport has occurred much more gradually compared to 
most other areas. Initial unreliability of new technologies and conservatism were the main 
reasons for the slow diffusion of transport innovations. Variance in the relative 
competitiveness between different modes of transport in various markets lengthened the 
process considerably. For example, road transport was replaced by rail quicker over long 
hauls, where the terminal costs were less of a factor than on shorter distances. Shipping has 
much higher terminal costs than the two aforementioned, but of the three is the cheapest over 
great distances. Therefore, second best technologies regularly continued in operation and 
coexistence, complementing the newer innovation. (Ville, 1990)  
It is possible to link the widespread use of new or improved forms of transportation to 
the five great surges of development. During the Industrial Revolution, a network of canals 
and waterways was built. Railways and steamships played a crucial part during the second 
and third revolutions. Personal automobiles and air travel became widespread in the fourth 
surge, where extensive networks of roads, highways, ports and airport were constructed. The 
most recent surge brought forth high-speed multi-modal physical transportation links by air, 
land and water. (Perez, 2010) 
Of the various means of transport, air travel is likely to be the most technologically 
complex of the four main methods of travel (air, road, rail and water) and provides by far the 
quickest way to transport goods and people. For that reason, an indicator for the efficiency of 
air travel services is incorporated in the empirical part of this research. 
 
 15 
3.3 ICT 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) were at the centre of the most 
recent technological revolution and have dramatically redesigned modern societies. In terms 
of specific technologies, it has progressed through radio, television, the Internet and mobile 
technologies (Thapa, Sæbø, 2014). Globalization would not have happened without the ICT 
revolution. Transoceanic fibre optics, the Internet and satellites enabled the complete 
reshaping of the structures and behaviours of modern trade and finance. (Perez, 2010)  
Measuring the overall effect of digital technologies on the economy and productivity 
is a difficult task. Nevertheless, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2008) claim, that the productivity 
surge in the second half of the 1990s was led by information technologies. Another line of 
research has looked at how ICT services may have affected trade. Freund and Weinhold 
(2004) offered empirical evidence that the internet has stimulated trade largely through cost 
reduction. Gomez-Herrera, Martens and Turlea (2014) also determined that distance-related 
trade cost have notably decreased in comparison to the traditional store trade in the same 
goods. This is supported by Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) who claimed that the development 
of ICT has lowered transportation costs of information and digital goods, as well as physical 
goods. The rise of digital purchasing technologies has meant that customers are inclined to 
purchase physical goods online, especially when offline buying is difficult or costly. 
Moreover, the internet has facilitated buying in bulk, particularly when goods are on sale, 
because customers do not have to be concerned about having to carry large amounts of 
purchases, further lowering the overall cost of transportation. 
While current discussions on development recognize ICT as integral for economic 
growth and the betterment of social conditions, ICT has also opened the “digital divide”, a 
noteworthy contemporary issue facing developing countries. The scarcity of ICT, especially 
restricted internet connectivity, deprives developing countries the significant growth 
opportunities and life improvement that are available to advanced countries. ICT services 
provide the means to participate in the global market and endeavours to develop them in poor 
areas provide great potential for economic development. (Avgerou, 2003) According to 
Thapa and Sæbø (2014), despite large yearly investments in ICT development projects in 
developing countries, major gains have not been reported. Poor management, lack of know-
how and no political will due to resistance to change have severely undermined this 
undertaking.  
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Harindranath and Sein (2007) argue that the outcome of ICT interventions hinges on 
how national and local governments as well as development agencies and organizations 
conceptualize ICT and development. Pertaining to the idea that ICT is merely a tool to 
automate processes in order to improve governmental efficiency is a major reason why 
important developmental objectives have not been reached, as a large portion of the potential 
of ICT is left unrealised. One of the frameworks Harindranath and Sein (2007) introduced 
was initially suggested by Malone and Rockart (1991) and it states, that society can be 
impacted by ICT through three effects. The primary effect entails the substitution of old 
technology by the new. The secondary effect involves an increase in the phenomenon 
enabled by the technology. The tertiary effect entails societal change and the generation of 
new technology-related businesses. The first two effects are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for development, while the tertiary effect is key for understanding the potential 
reach of the ICT influence and is instrumental for the sustainability of the developmental 
impact.  
Based on what we established in section 3, we have grounds to claim that a notable 
portion of technology adoption can be attributed to the sectors of energy, transport and ICT, 
which in turn suggests that they are highly influential in determining economic development. 
This assertion is tested in the empirical part of this paper. 
 
4 Data and method 
  
In order to determine if and how technology affects economic development, an 
instrumental variable regression (IV) was conducted and indicators for energy, transport and 
ICT were used as instruments for technology. For the reasons detailed earlier, we assert that 
those three sectors can determine a significant portion of a country’s technology adoption and 
in doing so, can indirectly account for a large share of economic development. For two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) we treat the technology indicator as endogenous and model the 
equations 
 
                                            log ( 𝑌𝐼/𝐿𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,     (1) 
 
where Yi/Li is output per capita in country i, ti is technology adoption, Xi is a set of controls, 
and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term and  
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                                           𝑡𝑖 = 𝜆 +  𝜇𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝜈𝑇𝑅𝑖
2 +  𝜉𝐼𝑖
2 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖,    (2) 
 
where E is energy efficiency regulation in country i, TR is efficiency of air transport services 
in country i, I is fixed-broadband internet subscriptions in country i and 𝜂𝑖 again a random 
error term.  
A standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of equation (1) will be included into 
the analysis as well, but we argue that using the IV method in the manner detailed will 
provide a much more informative and layered approach. It will enable us to incorporate the 
influence of energy, transport and ICT provide, as those sectors summarize most of the 
information on technology adoption. An important distinction must be made, while we argue 
that the energy, ICT and transport sectors can summarize a large portion of technology 
adoption and, in turn, economic development, instrumental variable regression relies on the 
assumption that the three technological indicators have no effect on economic development 
other than as a measure of the technology adoption. Considering the nature of our 
instruments, as we utilize really narrow sub-indicators from our sectors of interest, which are 
likely not to have a notable direct effect on GDP per capita on their own, the exclusion 
restriction is reasonable and plausible. 
The indicator used to describe economic development or Yi/Li in this paper is GDP 
per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP). The data was retrieved from World Bank 
and is for the year 2017, in current US dollars. The data for technology adoption (ti) came 
from a rich dataset originally created by Bockstette et al (2002) and then developed by 
Borcan et al (2017). The key figure utilized is a technology adoption indicator, which 
incorporates ten different technologies (each weighted equally): electricity, trucks, cars, 
tractors, cargo and passenger aviation, the internet, PC’s, cell phones and telephones, in per 
capita terms. It is in terms of years of usage of each technology relative to the number of 
years since the technology was invented. The measure was calculated capturing one minus 
the gap in the average intensity of technology adoption with respect to the US. The highest 
technology adoption figures can be found in Canada (0.93) and New Zealand (0.92) and the 
lowest in Mali (0.17) and Ethiopia (0.22). 
The technological indicators for energy, transport and ICT were retrieved from the 
Global Competitiveness Report dataset, which also uses World Bank databases. All three 
indicators are also for the year 2017. Energy efficiency regulation was chosen as an indicator 
for technological aptitude in the energy sector since it assesses a country’s performance in 
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energy efficiency as well as its policies and regulation to promote efficiency. Therefore, the 
indicator also incorporates an institutional element and can demonstrate the implications of 
lock-ins and surpassing them. The score is based on 13 individual indicators that are scored 
between 0 and 100 and weighted equally. They are: national energy efficiency planning; 
energy efficiency entities; information provided to consumers about electricity usage; energy 
efficiency incentives from electricity rate structures; incentives and mandates: industrial and 
commercial end users; incentives and mandates: public sector; incentives and mandates: 
utilities; financing mechanisms for energy efficiency; minimum energy efficiency 
performance standards; energy labelling systems; building energy codes; transport; and 
carbon pricing and monitoring. As argued in previous sections, more straightforward 
measures of, for example, energy production, are not broadly informative nor indicative of 
technological prowess. The countries with the highest indicators for energy efficiency are 
Italy (84) and Canada (83) and with the lowest are Mozambique (25) and Burundi (29).  
 We chose the indicator of the efficiency of air transport services to represent 
transport. It describes efficiency in the sense of frequency, punctuality, speed and price, from 
extremely inefficient to extremely efficient. Air transport can be considered as the pinnacle of 
technological accomplishment in conventional means of transport, therefore an indicator 
relating to it was preferred to, for example, road or rail infrastructure. The countries with the 
most efficient air transport services are the Netherlands (90) and Finland (88) and with the 
most inefficient are Lesotho (6) and Mozambique (33). 
 Thirdly, a fixed-broadband internet subscriptions variable was used as an indicator for 
information and communication technologies. It refers to the number of subscriptions for 
high-speed access to the public internet (TCP/IP connection), including cable modem, DSL, 
fibre, and other fixed (wired)-broadband technologies per 100 population. The countries with 
the most fixed-broadband internet subscriptions are Switzerland (46) and France (45) with 
the lowest are Guinea (0.01) and Burundi (0.04). 
To illustrate that other instruments from our fields of interest can be included to 
produce similar results and add value to our findings, alternative technological indicators 
were also used in another specification of the model, namely electrification rate, quality of 
roads and internet users. Electrification rate represents the percentage of the population with 
access to electricity. It is an estimate for the year 2017 and it entails a household having 
access to sufficient electricity to power a basic bundle of energy services. For example, a 
minimum of several lightbulbs and a phone. To represent transport, the quality of roads was 
chosen. It measures the quality of road infrastructure in the sense of extensiveness and 
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condition, from extremely poor to extremely good and is the weighted average of 2018-2019. 
The number of internet users is another measure of ICT adoption in a country. It represents 
the percentage of individuals who, in the last three months, used the internet from any 
location for any purpose, regardless of the network or device used. Those instruments were 
also retrieved from the Global Competitiveness Report dataset.  
When testing the functional form of the first phase of the 2SLS (equation 2), the 
Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) determined that the instruments 
should be squared. This finding indicates that the net effect on technology adoption is greater 
than the linear increases of our technology sector indicators.  
  The set of controls used in both equations of our baseline specification include 
technology adoption in the year 1500, urbanisation and regional dummies (America, Asia, 
Africa and Oceania, Europe, as the base, was omitted from the model). Technology adoption 
in 1500 CE summarizes information across the 4 sectors of transportation, military, industry 
and communications, and purposely excluding agriculture and incorporating 20 technologies. 
The overall measure was obtained by averaging across the sectors. The measure was 
included, as Comin et al. (2010) claimed, that “old technology matters” and illustrated that 
past technology adoption has a positive effect on per capita incomes today. In addition, 
technology adoption in 1500 CE can potentially summarise information on technology 
adoption prior to the technological revolutions, which we consider as a starting point for our 
key sectors. Regional dummies were included to capture broad geographical factors. Both the 
technology adoption indicator in 1500 CE and regional dummies were additionally retrieved 
from Borcan et al (2017). Lastly, an urbanisation figure was also retrieved from World Bank, 
specifically urban population as a percentage of overall population for the year 2018. 
Urbanisation was included as a control, as it is thought to be linked with economic 
development because it fosters human capital accumulation (Bertinelli, Zou, 2008).  
The descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the main results of the paper are 
detailed in Appendix A, Table 5. Most of the data was for 94 countries.  Those countries are 
also depicted in Appendix A, in Table 6, according to their regional dummy variable. A 
temporal analysis on GDP per capita was also conducted to illustrate that although we use 
cross-section data, our indicator is representative of the long-term development of a state.  
The descriptive statistics of average yearly growth rates of GDP per capita for 1990-2000 and 
2000-2017 can be found in Appendix A, Table 7. As can be seen, the growth rates are stable 
across countries (China is the notable exception), which indicates, that using GDP per capita 
for the year 2017 is appropriate for measuring longstanding economic development.  
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 To test the robustness of our models, in an alternative specification, GDP per capita 
was replaced by GDP per worker as the dependent variable. That figure was calculated using 
World Bank data for GDP and total labour force. Furthermore, to address any potential 
endogeneity concerns, three alternative controls (detailed info in Appendix B) we 
incorporated into the analysis.  
 
5 Results 
 
 
To illustrate how technology adoption and the squared technological sub-indicators 
relate to each other, a scatterplot with a smoothed conditional mean with a 0.95 confidence 
interval is included in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between technology adoption and the sum of squared energy, 
transport and ICT instruments 
Source: author 
 
As can be seen, a positive relationship exists between technology adoption and 
summed squares of energy efficiency regulation, efficiency of air transport services and 
fixed-broadband internet subscriptions. This informative relationship is used to instrument 
technology adoption in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. The indirect 
 21 
relationship between the squared instruments and log GDP per capita is illustrated in Figure 
2. Once again, a smoothed conditional mean with a 0.95 confidence interval was added.  
 
 
Figure 2. Indirect relationship between log GDP per capita and the sum of squared energy, 
transport and ICT instruments 
Source: author 
 
A clear, positive relationship between log GDP per capita and the sum of squared 
instruments is present, albeit it is not a direct relationship, but through technology adoption. 
The instruments can be utilized to describe economic development well. This will now be 
described in detail and shown quantitatively.  
Table 2 shows the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation for 
equations 1 and 2 with various specifications. Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates of our 
coefficient of interest from equation 1, 𝛽, and Panel B the corresponding first stages 
(equation 2). In Panel C, as a comparison, the results of a simple OLS estimation of equation 
(1) is shown, where technology adoption is treated as exogenous. The columns represent 
models with different controls, but regional dummies were included in all specifications of 
the models to capture broad geographical factors. Column 1 shows strong positive 
relationships between the first-stage instruments and technology adoption, all significant at 
the 1% level. The corresponding 2SLS estimate of the effect of technology adoption on GDP 
per capita is 3.87, also significant at the 1% level. Column 2 illustrates that adding  
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Table 2. 2SLS estimation of GDP per capita 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) 
Panel A: second stage     
Technology adoption 3.87*** 3.95*** 2.58*** 2.11*** 
 (0.445) (0.521) (0.548) (0.564) 
Technology adoption in 
1500 CE 
 -0.424  -0.135 
 (0.443)  (0.350) 
Urbanisation   1.62*** 2.18***  
  (0.409) (0.400) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Panel B: first stage     
Energy efficiency 
regulation squared 
0.0000153*** 0.0000167*** 0.0000109** 0.0000136*** 
(0.00000527) (0.00000508) (0.00000501) (0.00000507) 
Efficiency of air 
transport squared 
0.0000349*** 0.0000385*** 0.0000273*** 0.0000332*** 
(0.00000725) (0.00000719) (0.00000702) (0.00000730) 
Fixed-broadband 
internet subs. squared 
0.000176*** 0.000159*** 0.000160*** 0.000145*** 
(0.0000266) (0.0000276) (0.0000250) (0.0000272) 
Technology adoption in 
1500 CE 
 -0.141**  -0.106 
 (0.0673)  (0.0666) 
Urbanisation 
  0.208*** 0.148** 
   (0.0573) (0.0633) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.816 0.853 0.888 
Observations 79 66 79 66 
Panel C: ordinary least squares    
Technology adoption 3.61*** 3.70*** 2.23*** 1.97*** 
 (0.382) (0.450) (0.432) (0.447) 
Adjusted R2 0.807 0.816 0.854 0.888 
Standard errors in parenthesises    
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%  
 
technology adoption in 1500 into the baseline regression does not alter the highly significant 
and positive relationships present in column 1. The new variable is statistically significant 
only in the first stage, where it illustrates a negative relationship with technology adoption, 
alluding to the possibility of past technological lock-ins that hamper technological 
development in the present. Additionally, this result could refer to colonist setting extractive 
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institutions to countries that were relatively well developed at that time, hampering further 
progress, like argued by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). A negative relationship between 
technology adoption in 1500 and GDP per capita is present in Panel A too, but as it is 
statistically insignificant, no conclusive deductions can be drawn from it.  
 Adding urbanisation to the model in column 3 yields similar results, but notably both 
the coefficient for technology adoption and for efficiency of air travel services experienced a 
noticeable decrease. Urbanisation itself is statistically significant (at the 1% level) in both 
stages of the 2SLS, exhibiting a positive relationship with GDP per capita and technology 
adoption. Incorporating both technology adoption in 1500 CE and urbanisation in column 4 
yields a model with the most descriptive power. Of the two, only urbanisation retains its 
statistical significance and positive relationship with technology adoption in the first stage, as 
it does in the second stage with GDP per capita. The coefficients of the instruments remain 
similar to those in column 1, but the corresponding 2SLS estimate of the effect of technology 
adoption on GDP per capita is lower, at 2.11.   
All of our squared instruments possess statistically significant positive relationships 
with technology adoption. Their quadratic nature suggests that the net effect on technology 
adoption and, in turn, GDP per capita is greater than their linear increases. However, 
comparing the coefficients of the three is not quite straightforward, because while they all 
share a scale of 0 to 100, fixed-broadband internet subscriptions varies differently from 
energy efficiency regulation and efficiency of air travel services, as was detailed in the 
descriptive statistics in Table 6. We can still draw some conclusions. Energy efficiency 
regulation has the smallest coefficient of the three and is the only instrument to partially have 
statistical significance at only the 5% level (in column 3), while the remainder have statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Energy cannot be overlooked as a production input and while 
globally the limiting effect of energy scarcity has lessened, it is undoubtedly intrinsic for 
technological and economic development.  Energy efficiency highlights why breaking away 
from energy-intensive patterns and technological lock-ins is vital. Efficiency of air transport 
services, has the second biggest effect on technology adoption and, indirectly, on GDP per 
capita according to the models. Therefore, providing reliable, fast and affordable mobility to 
people and goods is surely an impactful factor on development. ICT, represented by fixed 
broadband internet subscriptions, provides the biggest opportunity for growth, both due to its 
biggest impact on technology adoption and in terms of where there is the most room for 
improvement. As the mean and median for fixed broadband internet subscriptions (per 100 
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people) is around 15 and the maximum, in Switzerland, is 46, there is yet ample room for 
improvement and much potential for technological and economic development.  
All four specifications of the models are statistically highly significant. The adjusted 
R2 coefficients reveal that our approach is highly descriptive. The model in column 4 can 
account for 88% of the variation in GDP per capita. Diagnostics tests were conducted on all 
specifications of the model and they too revealed, that everything was in order. We could 
clearly reject the null hypothesis (at 1% statistical significance level, as for all) of the Weak 
instruments test, which states that all instruments have no effect for all four specifications. 
The Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity revealed that our estimates are efficient and that our 
model corresponds to the data. Overidentification was checked by the Sargan test and we 
could not reject the null hypothesis for columns 1-3, meaning that all instruments were valid, 
but not for column 4, meaning there were too many instruments, leading to some being 
invalid. 
The 2SLS coefficient estimates are all larger than OLS estimates, which suggests that 
the noisiness of the technology variable might generate a typical problem of measurement 
error. This indicates that negative attenuation bias could be more relevant than the positive 
biases caused by reverse causality and omitted variables. Disentangling the multitude of 
clusters of political and economic institutions that influence economic development is a 
difficult undertaking and any one measurement can only account for just a part of the whole 
effect of the relevant cluster.  
To judge whether the magnitude of the 2SLS estimates are sensible, we use Bulgaria 
and Poland as examples. Bulgaria has a slightly above average technology adoption index of 
0.55 and increasing it by 0.1 would result in a 21%-39% increase of GDP per capita (if we 
use the range of estimates from table 2), specifically from 20,950 to about 25,400-29,100, 
bringing it in range of Greece (28,580), who has a technology adoption index of 0.65. 
Overall, Table 2 suggests a large, but probable impact of technology adoption on economic 
development and illustrates the three sector instruments can account for a significant part of 
economic development.  
In Table 3 alternative instruments were added to our baseline specification. They were 
included to illustrate that other instruments from our fields of interest, energy, transport and 
ICT can be deployed to produce similar results and add merit to our findings. Specifically, 
electrification rate, quality of roads and internet users were used as instruments for 
technology adoption. 
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Table 3. 2SLS estimation with alternative instruments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) 
Panel A: second stage    
Technology adoption 4.62*** 3.85*** 3.47*** 3.15*** 
 (0.496) (0.685) (0.706) (0.677) 
Technology adoption 
in 1500 CE 
  -0.290 -0.254 
  (0.34) (0.372) 
Urbanisation  0.936* 1.499*** 1.658***  
 (0.481) (0.468) (0.451) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Technology Technology Technology Technology 
Panel B: first stage     
Electrification rate -0.00000579  
 -0.0000064  
(0.00000646)  
 (0.00000623) 
Quality of roads 0.0000331*** 0.0000329*** 0.0000283*** 0.0000281***  
(0.00000649) (0.00000609) (0.00000713) (0.00000712) 
Internet users 0.0000431*** 0.0000254*** 0.0000303*** 0.0000325***  
(0.00000703) (0.00000737) (0.00000812) (0.00000838) 
Technology adoption 
in 1500 CE 
 
 -0.0447 -0.0317 
 
 (0.0780) (0.0790) 
Urbanisation  0.242*** 0.150* 0.171* 
  (0.0750) (0.0835) (0.0860) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.788 0.830 0.866 0.875 
Observations 79 79 66 66 
Standard errors in parenthesises    
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%  
 
Sticking with the controls that were included in Table 2, namely technology adoption 
in the year 1500, urbanisation and regional dummies, Table 3 validates our results, as a 
statistically highly significant (all at the 1% level) and positive relationship between 
technology adoption and GDP per capita was found. The coefficients for GDP per capita are 
somewhat higher compared to table 1, but in the same region. However, electrification rate as 
an instrument for technology adoption proved to be statistically insignificant in the first 
stages of the two-stage least squares estimations, which meant it was dropped from the 
models presented in columns 2 and 3. This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
foundation on which this paper is based.  46 countries out of the possible 94 had an 
electrification rate of 100%, which means it is not a reliable indicator for technological 
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progress for most countries, even though it remains a development constraint for poor 
countries.  
 The quality of roads proved to be significant at the 1% level in all four specifications, 
as did the number of internet users. Both exhibited a strictly positive relationship with 
technology adoption, meaning that they have an indirect positive effect on economic 
development represented by GDP per capita.  
While urbanisation remains statistically significant and exhibits a positive relationship 
with technology adoption in the first phase of the 2SLS, technology adoption in the year 1500 
proves to be statistically insignificant in both phases.  
All in all, Table 3 presents us four models, each statistically significant at the 1% 
level and with high descriptive powers, that range from 79% to 88%. The weak instruments 
diagnostic tests revealed no issues, but the Wu-Hausman test indicates that there are 
endogeneity issues with column 1 and 4. Moreover, a statistically significant Sargan test 
statistic alluded to overidentification problems in column 4.  
 
6 Robustness 
 
To examine the robustness of our previous findings and address any potential 
endogeneity concerns, we use four alternative controls and replace GDP per capita by GDP 
per worker as the dependent variable. The validity of the 2SLS findings in Tables 2 and 3 
depends on the assumption that our energy, transport and ICT instruments have no direct 
effect on GDP per capita. While we judge this assumption to be plausible, we will now 
conduct an additional test on it by controlling for other potential variables that might be 
correlated with both our instruments and GDP per worker and examining whether adding 
those variables affects our estimates. Although this undertaking cannot totally rule out 
endogeneity concerns, we find in Table 4 that our central results are robust to the new 
controls. Detailed information and descriptive statistics for the alternative controls are in 
Appendix B. 
The 2SLS estimates for GDP per worker in Table 4 were close to twice the value of 
GDP per capita (Table 2), which is proportional to the size of the workforce of most 
countries, as it amounts to less than half of the whole population on average. La Porta et al. 
(1998) argue that legal origins had an important role in shaping current institutions. For that  
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Table 4. 2SLS estimation with alternative controls and of GDP per worker 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
log GDP per 
worker 
log GDP per 
worker 
log GDP per 
worker 
log GDP per 
worker 
Panel A: second stage    
Technology adoption 6.242*** 6.381*** 6.13*** 6.280*** 
 (0.333) (0.392) (0.474) (0.391) 
Military technology in 
1500 CE 
  0.207  
  (0.226)  
State hist.   
  0.521  
 
  (0.391) 
Legal origins No Yes Yes Yes 
  
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Technology 
adoption 
Panel B: first stage     
Energy efficiency 
regulation squared 
0.0000120** 0.0000149** 0.0000171** 0.0000170*** 
(0.00000580) (0.00000606) (0.00000644) (0.00000613) 
Efficiency of air 
transport squared 
0.0000378*** 0.0000317*** 0.0000343*** 0.0000328*** 
(0.00000838) (0.00000865) (0.00000918) (0.00000857) 
Fixed-broadband 
internet subscr. sq. 
0.000194*** 0.000194*** 0.000208*** 0.000193*** 
(0.0000269) (0.0000278) (0.0000299) (0.0000275) 
Military technology in 
1500 CE 
 
 -0.0807**  
  (0.0386)  
State hist.  
  -0.105 
  
  (0.0643) 
Legal origins No Yes Yes Yes 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.833 0.842 0.854 0.845 
Observations 79 79 79 79 
Standard errors in parenthesises    
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%  
 
reason, the alternative 2SLS models in columns 2-4 were compiled with the regional 
dummies being replaced by legal origins dummies (Socialist, French, Scandinavian, 
German), British legal origins, as the base, was omitted. That change had little impact on our 
key estimates. 
 Dincecco and Prado (2012) argued, that to wage past wars, states made fiscal 
innovations to raise revenues, which in turn improved long-term fiscal capacity and economic 
development. To account for this potential effect, we include a variable for military 
technology in the year 1500 on the basis that states with the most advanced militaries needed 
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to raise the most funds to support it, which helped to shape more efficient fiscal institutions 
on the long-term basis. Column 3 includes the military technology in 1500 CE measure in the 
baseline specification. We find the impact of technology adoption unchanged. As can be seen 
in Panels A and B, past military technology is statistically significant only in the first stage of 
the 2SLS, not having an apparent effect on GDP per worker directly. It has a negative effect 
on technology adoption, suggesting that past military technology could indeed have improved 
fiscal institutions, but might also have subjected states to technological lock-ins. The 
estimates for our instruments remain similar to previous specifications.   
Borcan et al (2017) claimed that a hump-shape relationship exists between 
accumulated state history (measured by a normalized aggregate index of state history) and 
economic development, as accrued state experience increases productivity, while younger 
states have the potential to reach higher maximums. Therefore, in the long-run, for the mature 
states, the link between state experience and productivity is predicted to turn negative. To 
account for this potential factor, we include a state history variable in column 4, where it can 
be seen not to exhibit any meaningful effect nor statistical significance. Moreover, the Wu-
Hausman test showed that there are endogeneity issues and a model of this specification does 
not correspond the data. An additional model was estimated where, in order to capture the 
potential hump-shaped effect, both linear and squared terms of the state history variable were 
included, but neither proved to be statistically significant.  
In summary, Table 4 presents us with four highly statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) models with high degrees of descriptiveness (around 84%). While including the 
alternative controls cannot rule out endogeneity issues in their entirety, our central results still 
all remained highly significant and robust, which reinforces the claim that our energy, 
transport and ICT indicators are credibly exogenous. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
While the integral part technology plays in economic development is widely 
recognized, too often an unwarranted one-directional approach is adopted. We argue that 
although it is very difficult to fully disentangle the countless variables that potentially 
influence growth, a significant portion, of economic and technological development can be 
attributed to three key technological areas – energy, transport and ICT. Those sectors can be 
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used to summarize crucial information on technology adoption, making excellent 
instruments, as was evidenced by modelling more than 80% of technology’s effect. 
In our empirical analysis, we used the source of variation that arose from the strong 
positive correlation between our energy, transport and ICT measures and the technology 
adoption indicator to estimate substantial effects of technology adoption on GDP per capita. 
Those findings proved to be robust to a variety of specifications and controls. Since the 
narrow industry indicators of energy efficiency regulation, efficiency of air transport services 
and fixed-broadband internet subscriptions are not likely to have a direct effect on GDP per 
capita and are therefore exogenous, they make for plausible instruments.  
The results indicate, that ICT offers the most potential for further growth and has the 
biggest effect on economic development. This finding is supported by Perez (2010), who 
maintained that the maturity of the current ICT revolution has not yet been reached. 
Transport technology has been very impactful on technology adoption and, in turn, economic 
development so far as well. This is in line with the assertions made by Cigu et al. (2019) and 
Ville (1990). The availability of affordable energy is an extremely robust growth constraint 
for developing countries, but the issue (developed) countries grapple with the most today is 
energy efficiency, since past investments have locked many states into energy-intensive 
paths, producing much inefficiency and making them vulnerable, which reinforces the 
findings of Benthem (2015) and Fouquet (2016). It is evident, that in order to promote 
economic development, states should recognize the crucial role technology plays and invest 
accordingly, as well as doing the upmost to support innovation. The frequency and severity 
of existing technological paradigms hampering the adoption of more advanced ones is 
regularly underestimated and calls for state intervention. Replacing existing technological 
paradigms can be difficult and painful processes but will be a major source of growth. 
Technological lock-ins were a part of this analysis, albeit not in the forefront, but 
more effort to measure its effects could be a valuable avenue of further research, to which the 
implications reached here could provide a starting point. This paper does not identify the 
precise technological advancement processes to guide economic development and a specific 
investigation into the exact channels could be another potential area of future research.  
The author expresses her upmost gratitude to Kadri Ukrainski, without whose 
absolute support throughout the planning and writing process this thesis surely would not 
have seen the light of day. Sincerest thanks also extend to Jaan Masso, his feedback played 
no small part in shaping this paper and his carefully planned program has opened several 
doors for the author professionally.   
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Appendix A 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the variables used 
  Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
GDP per capita, in PPP USD 94 21734 16577 18323 738 77596 
Technology adoption 79 0.49 0.45 0.21 0.17 0.93 
Energy Efficiency Regulation 94 53.30 57.27 23.20 5.77 89.15 
Efficiency of air transport service 94 59.9 61.0 15.0 6.04 89.9 
Fixed-broadband Internet subs. 94 16.50 13.45 14.80 0.0093 46.33 
Europe (dummy) 94 0.33 0 0.47 0 1 
America (dummy) 94 0.17 0 0.378 0 1 
Asia (dummy) 94 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 
Africa (dummy) 94 0.27 0 0.44 0 1 
Oceania (dummy) 94 0.02 0 0.15 0 1 
Technology adoption in 1500 CE 67 0.53 0.53 0.33 0 1 
Urbanisation 94 0.63 0.64 0.21 0.13 0.98 
British legal origin (dummy) 94 0.26 0 0.44 0 1 
Socialist legal origin (dummy) 94 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 
French legal origin (dummy) 94 0.46 0 0.50 0 1 
Scandinavian legal origin 
(dummy) 94 0.032 0 0.18 0 1 
German legal origin (dummy) 94 0.04 0 0.20  0 1 
GDP per worker, PPP USD 94 33093 16394 39092 473 174169 
Electrification rate 94 86.0 99.998 25.2 10.09 100 
Quality of roads 94 4.06 4.00 1.05 2.04 6.43 
Internet users 94 61.2 68.7 26.6 2.66 99.01 
 Source: author, based on data from World Bank and Borcan et al (2017) 
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Appendix A cont. 
 
 
Table 6. Countries used in the paper according to their regional dummy variable 
Region Represented Countries 
Europe 31 
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, North Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
America 16 
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru 
Asia 21 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Georgia, 
India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia 
Africa 24 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal 
Oceania 2 Australia, New Zealand 
Source: author, based on data from World Bank and Borcan et al (2017) 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of average yearly growth rates of GDP per capita 
  Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
Average yearly growth 
of GDP per capita 
between 1990 and 
2000 
87 0.0178 0.0170 0.00332 -0.0558 0.142 
Average yearly growth 
GDP per capita 
between 2000 and 
2017 
94 0.0354 0.0290 0.00346 -0.00554 0.184 
Source: author, based on data from World Bank 
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Appendix B 
 
Data appendix for the alternative controls used in Table 5. 
 
Legal origins: dummy variables for English, French, Socialist, Scandinavian and German 
legal origins. States with English legal origins comprised the default group. Source: Borcan et 
al. (2017). 
Military technology in 1500 CE: indicator for military technology in the year 1500. Source: 
Borcan et al. (2017). 
Statehist: normalized aggregate index of state history, defined as the sum of all 50-year 
period state history scores, adjusted by a 1% discount factor. Takes into account if there is a 
government above a tribal level, is the government based locally or foreign and how much of 
the territory of the modern country was ruled by it. Reaches back to 3500 BCE and is for the 
year 2000. Source: Borcan et al. (2017). 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of the alternative controls 
  Obs Mean Median SD Min Max 
British legal origins 94 0.223 0 0.419 0 1 
French legal origins 94 0.234 0 0.426 0 1 
Socialist legal origins 94 0.447 0 0.499 0 1 
Scandinavian legal orgins 94 0.043 0 0.203 0 1 
German legal orgins 94 0.054 0 0.227 0 1 
Military technology in 1500 67 0.420 0.375 0.396 0 1 
Statehist 94 0.246 0.227 0.164 0.0186 0.743 
Source: author, based on data from World Bank and Borcan et al (2017) 
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